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faktorokruhy dále používá jako okruhy šifrových textů. Gröbnerovy báze dávají
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pro plně homomorfní šifrování.
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Abstract: The current mainstream in fully homomorphic encryption is the appro-
ach that uses the theory of lattices. The thesis explores alternative approaches to
homomorphic encryption. First we present a code-based homomorphic encrypti-
on scheme by Armknecht et. al. and study its properties. Then we describe the
family of cryptosystems commonly known as Polly Cracker and identify its pro-
blematic aspects. The main contribution of this thesis is the design of a new fully
homomorphic symmetric encryption scheme based on Polly Cracker. It proposes
a new approach to overcoming the complexity of the simple Polly Cracker - based
cryptosystems. It uses Gröbner bases to generate zero-dimensional ideals of po-
lynomial rings over finite fields whose factor rings are then used as the rings of
ciphertexts. Gröbner bases equip these rings with a multiplicative structure that
is easily algorithmized, thus providing an environment for a fully homomorphic
cryptosystem.
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As it becomes more and more common to outsource calculations with data, the
demand for a secure, effective, fully homomorphic encryption scheme rises. Such
scheme would allow for evaluation of multivariate polynomials over ciphertexts. A
customer could encrypt his data, send it for calculations and receive the encrypted
result. Decryption would reveal the result of the same calculations performed on
the plaintext data. No one but the customer, who knows the secret key could gain
knowledge about either plaintext data or the calculated result.
The first chapter describes the concept of homomorphic encryption as an
important cryptographic primitive with a variety of practical use. The cryptosys-
tems that are homomorphic with respect to either addition or multiplication have
been well known since the appearance of RSA cryptosystem. They are used in
protocols for distance electronic voting, e.g. in [FOO92], electronic bidding, e.g.
the Dutch crop auctions [BCD+08] and many other protocols.
A fully homomorphic cryptosystem, called Polly Cracker has been presented
in 1994 in [FK94] by Neal Koblitz and Michael Fellows. We describe this scheme
in Chapter 4. As we show, the parameters in this scheme cannot be set up in such
way that it would be both effective and secure.
Certainly the most promising fully homomorphic scheme so far has been pre-
sented by Craig Gentry in 2009 in [Gen09]. The scheme is loosely based on Polly
Cracker. It uses the theory of lattices and many sophisticated tricks such as self-
evaluating circuits. Detailed description of this scheme is out of the scope of this
thesis. Let us just point out, that it allows for an unlimited number of multipli-
cations, does not have any bound on the number of plaintexts encrypted with
the same key and its security is based on certain worst-case problems over ideal
lattices and the sparse subset sum problem. The downside of the scheme is the
size of the keys (in gigabytes) and the high complexity of operations with the
ciphertexts, which make it impractical for commercial use at this stage. However,
the scheme is still under development and is becoming more and more practical
with each paper published on the topic.
Another noteworthy paper on homomorphic encryption [AAPS11] has been
published by Armknecht et. al. in 2011. It uses a completely different approach
to the problem of homomorphic encryption. Instead of ideals of multivariate po-
lynomial rings it works with linear codes. It uses their natural property of being
additive. We study this scheme closely in Chapter 2. The security of the scheme
is based on the assumed hardness of decoding in a random code. Its limitation
is a tight bound on the number of plaintexts that can be encrypted with one
key and a bound on the number of multiplications performed on the ciphertexts.
This bound is arbitrary, but the complexity of the operations on ciphertexts rises
quickly with it. We explore some ways of overcoming this limitation in Section
2.3, but we do not succeed.
Chapter 3 reviews basic definitions and propositions about Gröbner bases and
zero-dimensional ideals.
In Chapter 5 we present a new symmetric encryption scheme SymPC-version
1 that is fully homomorphic. It is based on Polly Cracker, but the Gröbner bases
play a totally different role here. Instead of being a threat, as an attacker, who
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computes some Gröbner basis could break the system with it, in this scheme
we take advantage of Gröbner bases to significantly reduce the complexity of all
Setup, Encryption, Decryption and operations with the ciphertexts. Complexity
of these is treated in Section 5.1.
In Chapter 6 we design two attacks at SymPC1. The following Chapter 7
suggests parameter settings so that these two attacks may be avoided and further
explores the security of SymPC1.
We conclude the thesis by Chapter 8, where we propose a second version
SymPC2, which has a lower complexity of some of the functions and is optimized,
so that even a weaker setting of parameters avoids the two attacks from Chapter 6.
We conjecture, that the changes made to the algorithm between versions SymPC1
and SymPC2 do not affect the security of the cryptosystem.
3
1. Preliminaries
We begin with a definition of a cryptosystem as presented by Stinson in [Sti95].
Definition 1. A cryptosystem is a five-tuple (P , C,K, E ,D), where the following
conditions are satisfied:
1. P is a finite set of possible plaintexts
2. C is a finite set of possible ciphertexts
3. K, the keyspace, is a finite set of possible keys
4. For each K ∈ K, there is an encryption rule eK ∈ E and a corresponding
decryption rule dK ∈ D. Each eK : P −→ C and dK : C −→ P are functions
such that dK (eK(x)) = x for every plaintext x ∈ P
Note that the Condition 4 implies that eK is injective for all K ∈ K. Let us
take x1, x2 ∈ P and K ∈ K such that eK(x1) = eK(x2) = y. Then Condition 4
says that dK(y) = x1 and dK(y) = x2, therefore x1 = x2 and eK is injective for
all K.
Definition 2 (Probabilistic Cryptosystem). Let (P , C,K, E ,D) be a cryptosys-
tem. If for all K ∈ K, the function eK : P −→ C is non-deterministic, we call
such cryptosystem probabilistic. In other words, there are many different ways to
encrypt a message m with the key K and eK(m) is a subset of C.
Sometimes we shall use eK(m) to denote a particular random encryption of
m and sometimes to denote the set of all possible encryptions. In most cases it
will not matter and in others the meaning should be clear from the context.
Clearly, it the case of probabilistic cryptosystems, the function dK cannot be
injective. It may happen, that eK(P) ( C. Then there are such w ∈ C, that
dK(w) = m ∈ P , but w /∈ eK(m). Examples of such cryptosystems will be shown
later.
Definition 3 (Homomorphic Cryptosystem). Let (P , C,K, E ,D) be a cryptosys-
tem. If P = P (α1, . . . , αn) and C = C (β, . . . , βn) are algebras and if for all
K ∈ K, eK is a homomorphism of algebras P and C, we say that cryptosystem
(P , C,K, E ,D) is homomorphic with respect to α1, . . . , αn.
Example 4 (RSA cryptosystem). Let p, q be distinct primes, n = p · q and let
K = {K = (e, d) | e, d ∈ Z∗ϕ(n), d = e−1 mod ϕ(n)}. Let
eK : Zn (·, 1) −→ Zn (·, 1)
x 7−→ xe mod n
dK : Zn (·, 1) −→ Zn (·, 1)
x 7−→ xd mod n
Then (Zn,Zn,K, {eK | K ∈ K}, {dK | K ∈ K}) is called RSA cryptosystem.
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The function eK is a homomorphism of monoids:
eK(x1) = x
e
1, eK(x2) = x
e
2
eK(x1 · x2) = (x1 · x2)e = xe1 · xe2 = eK(x1) · eK(x2) .
Therefore RSA is a multiplicatively homomorphic cryptosystem.
Our goal is to construct an encryption scheme that would be homomorphic
with respect to addition and multiplication, i.e. for all m1,m2 ∈ P this would
allow us to compute e(m1 ·m2) and e(m1+m2) from the knowledge of e(m1) and
e(m2). Such schemes are often referred to as fully homomorphic.
1.1 Remarks on the notation
In Rn, where R is a commutative ring and n ∈ N, the addition and multiplication
is always meant componentwise. We shall use this notation throughout the whole
thesis and it will always be denoted as regular + and ·.
+ : Rn ×Rn −→ Rn
(r1, . . . , rn) + (r′1, . . . , r
′
n) 7−→ (r1 + r′1, . . . , rn + r′n)
· : Rn ×Rn −→ Rn
(r1, . . . , rn) · (r′1, . . . , r′n) 7−→ (r1 · r′1, . . . , rn · r′n)
The + in ”ri + r′i” and · in ”ri · r′i” mean addition and multiplication in the















Let A be a finite set. Then a ← A denotes: Choose a from A uniformly at
random.
Throughout the thesis, F shall denote a finite field.
1.2 Lagrange interpolation
In the following section we define two functions Lag and Ev. Let x1, . . . , xn ∈ F
be n distinct points in F, x := (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Fn. The function Ev evaluates a
polynomial in the n points of x to get a vector in Fn. The function Lag interpolates
a vector in the n points of x to get a polynomial in F[x] of a degree less than n.
We denote L := {p ∈ F[x] | deg(p) < n}.
Definition 5. Let F be a finite field, |F| ≥ n and let x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Fn such
that all xi are distinct. We define mappings
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Lagx : Fn −→ F[x]







Evx : F[x] −→ Fn
p 7−→ (p(x1), . . . , p(xn))
Proposition 6. The function Evx is a bijection of L to Fn. The function Lagx
is its inverse, i.e. Evx ◦Lagx = IdFn.
Proof. Injectivity: Let p, q ∈ F[x], such that p(xi) = q(xi) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
deg(p) < n and deg(q) < n. Then (p − q)(xi) = 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and
deg(p− q) < n. The polynomial p− q has at least n roots, which is more than its
degree, so p− q ≡ 0 ∈ F[x] and p = q.
The size of Fn is |F|n and the number of polynomials of a degree less than n
over F is also |F|n. Evx is an injective mapping of two sets of the same size, so it
has to be bijective.
We need to prove that for all w ∈ Fn it holds that Evx (Lagx(w)) = w, i.e.






















xi−xj = 0. Therefore





= wl · 1 = wl
and Evx ◦Lagx is an identity on Fn.
Proposition 7. For the composition of the functions Lagx and Evx it holds
Lagx ◦Evx : F[x] −→ L
p 7−→ p mod
∏n
i=1(x− xi) .
Proof. From the previous proposition we can see that Lagx ◦Evx = IdL, i.e. for
any polynomial p ∈ F[x] of a degree less than n we have




Now let deg(p) ≥ n. Set p′ = p mod
∏n
i=1(x − xi) and q ∈ F[x], such that






















Lagx ◦Evx(p) = Lagx ◦Evx (p′) = p′ ,
which concludes the proof.
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2. Homomorphic encryption
schemes from linear codes
The symmetric encryption scheme presented by Armknecht et al. in [AAPS11]
(to be described in detail in Section 2.2) is rather inspiring than useful. It uses
the natural property of linear codes being additive, but struggles with the mul-
tiplicativity, as we will see towards the end of this chapter.
Suppose we have m1,m2,m3 ∈ F, we would like to calculate the product
m1 · m2 · m3 ∈ F and we want to outsource this calculation. However, we do
not want the company, who performs the calculation for us, to know neither
m1,m2,m3 nor m1 ·m2 ·m3. We can also tolerate if the company has to do some
extra calculations. In the ideal scenario, we would like to have a multiplicatively
homomorphic scheme. For now, we construct a scheme with a weaker property.
The following definition is a generalization of a definition from [AAPS11].
Definition 8 (µ-multiplicative cryptosystem). Let (P , C,K, E ,D) be a crypto-
system, µ ∈ N. If for every K ∈ K and every w(1), ...,w(l) ∈ eK (P), the ”fresh
encryptions”, where l ≤ µ, it holds that
∏l
j=1w











we call such cryptosystem µ-multiplicative.
In the definition we used the term ”fresh encryption”. An element w ∈ C is
a fresh encryption, if there exists such m ∈ P , that w ∈ eK(m). Note, that in
general, this is not equivalent to the fact, that there exists such m ∈ P , that
dK(w) = m.








might not be one of possible encryptions of
∏l
j=1mj, however, the definition of
µ-multiplicativity requires that it will be decrypted to
∏l
j=1mj.
In the scheme proposed by Armknecht et al.[AAPS11] the multiplicativity is
achieved by a trick with multiplicative codes. Let us explain this concept on a
simplified example.
2.1 Example of 3-multiplicative scheme
In this section we describe a simple probabilistic 3-multiplicative cryptosystem.
Let F be a finite field F5 = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}. We fix the secret key K = (x, y), where
y ∈ F and x = (x1, x2, x3, x4) ∈ F4 in such way that all xi and y are distinct. We
use the set of plaintexts P = F and the set of ciphertexts C ⊆ F4. The encoding
shall be denoted EncK .
F EncK−−−−−−−−−→ F4
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It is done in two steps - Expression and Evaluation. The two functions are denoted
Exy and Evx. Exy depends on the secret element y ∈ F and Evx depends on the
secret vector x ∈ F4.
F Exy−−→ F[x] Evx−−→ F4
m 7−→ pm 7−→ w
The function Expression works as follows: for a message m ∈ F take a random
polynomial p∗ ∈ F[x] of a degree at most 1 and set
Exy(m) = pm := p
∗ − p∗(y) +m ∈ F[x] .
We see that the function assigns to a message m a random polynomial of degree
at most one, such that pm(y) = m and it is probabilistic.
The function Evaluation takes a polynomial p ∈ F[x] and evaluates it in the
four points of x ∈ F4.
Evx(p) = w := (p(x1), . . . , p(x4)) ∈ F4
Our encoding EncK is a probabilistic function and it is a composition of the
probabilistic function Exy and a deterministic function Evx.
EncK : F
Exy−−→ F[x] Evx−−→ C
m 7−→ pm 7−→ w
The decoding is done as follows:
DecK : F4
Lagx−−−→ F[x] Evy−−→ F
w 7−→ pw 7−→ pw(y)
As we have seen in Section 1.2, the function Lagx is the inverse to Evx, as
long as the random polynomial pm was chosen in such way, that its degree was
strictly less than four. Correctness of the scheme is quite straightforward:
DecK (EncK(m)) = DecK (Evx (Exy(m))) = Evy(Lagx(Evx (Exy(m)))
= Evy(Exy(m)) = (Exy(m))(y) = (p
∗ − p∗(y) +m)(y) = m
Now let us take m1,m2,m3 ∈ F and p1, p2, p3 ∈ F[x], their respective possi-
ble images by Exy. We set w(1),w(2),w(3) ∈ F4 the evaluations of p1, p2, p3 re-
spectively, w(j) = (w(j)1 , . . . , w
(j)
4 ). Then w
(1),w(2),w(3) are possible encodings of















Now we show that this cryptosystem is 3-multiplicative. In other words, if
we take three encodings of messages, multiply them through and then we decode


















= m1 ·m2 ·m3.
We set w = (w1, . . . , w4) := w(1) · w(2) · w(3) ∈ F4. We are going to look for a
polynomial pw ∈ F[x] of a degree at most three, such that pw(xi) = wi. We see




i = p1(xi) · p2(xi) ·
p3(xi) = (p1 · p2 · p3) (xi). The polynomials pw and p1 · p2 · p3 are both of a degree
at most three and they are equal in at least four points, hence they are necessarily
equal and DecK(w) = pw(y) = (p1 · p2 · p3) (y) = p1(y) ·p2(y) ·p3(y) = m1 ·m2 ·m3
which gives us the multiplicative property for three codewords.
Now let us introduce some notation. We set
C1 = eK(P) =
{






w ∈ F4 | ∃p ∈ F[x], deg(p) ≤ 1,w = Evx(p)
}
,
C1 is a linear subspace of F4 isomorphic to the additive group of the ring
(F2,+,−, ·, (0, 0), (1, 1)). (In particular C1 is a Reed-Solomon code of length n
and degree 1.)
Proof. Let w ∈ F4, such that w = Evx(pw), for some pw ∈ F[x], deg(pw) ≤ 1.
Then m := pw(y) ∈ F and Pr[Exy(m) = pw)] > 0, hence Pr[EncK(m) = w)] > 0
and w ∈ C1. On the other hand, if w = EncK(m), then w = Evx(pm), for some
pm ∈ F[x], such that deg(pm) ≤ 1 and w ∈ {w ∈ F4 | ∃p ∈ F[x], deg(p) ≤ 1,
w = Evx(p)}.
We show, that C1 is a vector space. Let w,w′ ∈ C1. Then deg(pw) ≤ 1 and
deg(pw′) ≤ 1. pw+w′ = Lagx(w + w′) and Lagx is an additive homomorphism,
so Lagx(w + w
′) = Lagx(w) + Lagx(w
′) and deg(Lagx(w + w
′)) ≤ 1, therefore
w + w′ ∈ C1. Similarly, we can show that a · w ∈ C1 for all a ∈ F and for all
w ∈ C1. The fact, that C1 is a Reed-Solomon code of length four and degree one
comes straight from the definition of Reed-Solomon codes.
Now we show, that the mapping
ϕ : C1 −→ F2
(w1, w2, w3, w4) 7−→ (w1, w2)
is an isomorphism of additive groups. It is obvious, that ϕ is a homomorphism.
We have Ker(ϕ) = {w ∈ C1 | w1 = w2 = 0}. Let w ∈ Ker(ϕ) and pw = a · x + b
for some a, b ∈ F.
w1 =pw(x1) = 0 = ax1 + b
w2 =pw(x2) = 0 = ax2 + b
⇒ ax1 = ax2 and as x1 6= x2 ⇒ a, b = 0 .
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We have deg(p) ≤ 1, it is well defined since x1 6= x2. We set w̃ := Evx(p). Then
w̃ ∈ C1, w̃1 = w1 and w̃2 = w2. We conclude, that ϕ is surjective.
Similarly, we define C2 and C3,
C2 =
{




w ∈ F4 | ∃p ∈ F[x], deg(p) ≤ 3,w = Evx(p)
}
Note that C2 and C3 are linear codes, C2 ∼= F3 and C3 = F4. We have the
following chain of subcodes:
C1 ( C2 ( C3 = F4
The fact that Ci 6= Ci+1 is to be shown in Proposition 14. The elements of the
linear code C1 are exactly the evaluation vectors of all polynomials of degree at
most one, the elements of C2 are the evaluations of polynomials of degree at most
two. If we multiply at most two polynomials of degree at most one, we get a
polynomial of a degree at most two. Analogically, if we multiply at most two
codewords from C1, we get a codeword from C2, which can still be decoded back
to the product of the original messages.
Similarly, the product of up to three codewords from C1 is a codeword in C3
and may be decoded correctly. Also the product of a codeword from C1 and a
codeword from C2 is a codeword in C3 and may be well decoded.
In the following counter-example, we show, that if we take more than three
codewords from C1, it may happen, that the decoding of their product does not
equal the product of their decoding.
Example 10 (Counter-example). Fix K = (x, y) = ((0, 1, 2, 3), 4). We take four
messages in F5 and we encode them to get four codewords from C1.
m1 = 1 p1 = x+ 2 w(1) = (2, 3, 4, 0)
m2 = 3 p2 = x+ 4 w(2) = (4, 0, 1, 2)
m3 = 3 p3 = 2x w(3) = (0, 2, 4, 1)




















= DecK(w) = Evy (Lagx(0, 0, 1, 0))
= Evy(2x



































for some q(x) ∈ F[x]. Hence











DecK w(j) + q(y) · a ,
for some a ∈ F∗. a is non-zero, because y is distinct from all xis. We see, that
DecK(w) does not equal
∏4
j=1DecK w
(j), whenever q(y) is non-zero. In this
example, q(x) = 1 and q(y) = 1.
Clearly, C4 = {w ∈ F4 | ∃p ∈ F[x], deg(p) ≤ 4,w = Evx(p)} is a subset of F4,
but we can no longer ensure, that all codewords in C4 are to be decoded correctly.
We have seen, that the scheme is 3-multiplicative. We return to the sug-
gested problem: We want to outsource a computation of m1 · m2 · m3, without
providing any information about the data. We make use of the cryptosystem
the following way: We send the company vectors w(1),w(2),w(3) = EncK(m1),
EncK(m2), EncK(m3). They calculate the product w =
∏3
j=1 EncK(mj) and send
it back to us. We compute DecK(w) and we get the desired product m1 ·m2 ·m3,
without ever revealing m1,m2,m3,m1 ·m2 ·m3.
If we need to calculate the product of one codeword from C1 and another from
C2, it is still fine, but imagine, we ask the company for a product of w(1),w(2) ∈ C2.
We would likely prefer them to return an error, as w(1) ·w(2) is not necessarily in
C3 and we cannot be sure of the correctness of its decryption.
Unless we provide the company with some extra information, they cannot tell
the codewords from C1, C2 and C3 apart, as they cannot calculate the underlying
polynomial pw and see its degree. However, we do not want to provide them
with information about the secret key. Instead we can send pairs in the form
(w, deg(pw)). The company then returns
{
w′ ·w′ if deg(pw′) + deg(pw′) ≤ 3,
error if deg(pw′) + deg(pw′) > 3 .
There is an obvious limitation of this scheme. We can only multiply at most
three encodings to keep the correctness. How do we overcome this limitation?
Well, we take a larger field F and a longer vector x, say length(x) = n and then
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we can do up to n − 1 multiplications. No matter what n we take, we are still
limited and the cost is high in terms of computation complexity. The length of
codewords is linear with the number of possible multiplications.
2.2 Scheme proposed by Armknecht et al.
In July 2011 in [AAPS11] Frederik Armknecht, Daniel Augot, Ludovic Perret and
Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi proposed a code-based scheme for symmetric encryption
that is homomorphic with respect to addition and in a limited way it is also
multiplicatively homomorphic.
The paper describes a generic construction based on so called special eva-
luation codes and presents an instantiation of these by Reed-Muller codes. We
shall describe the instantiation by Reed-Solomon codes directly. The scheme uses
the natural property of linear codes being additive groups. It achieves a limited
multiplicativity, implementing a scheme, that is similar to the one we described
in Section 2.1.
Algorithm 1 describes the cryptosystem proposed by Armknecht et al., in-
stantiated by the Reed-Solomon codes. The set of messages P = F, the set of
ciphertexts C = Fn and the keys K ∈ K are triples (x, y, I), where x ∈ Fn, y ∈ F
and I ⊆ {1, . . . , n}.
The vector x ∈ Fn is called codeword support, y ∈ F is called message support
and the set I is called the set of good locations. We shall denote EncK(m) =
Encrypt(m,K) and DecK(c) = Decrypt(c,K).
Proposition 11. Algorithm 1 describes a cryptosystem.
Proof. Let us check the four conditions from the definition of a cryptosystem.
1. P = F is a finite set.
2. C ⊂ Fn is a finite set.
3. The key-space
K = {(x, y, I) | x ∈ Fn, y ∈ F, I ⊂ {1, ..., n}, xi 6= xj 6= y,∀i, j ≤ n, |I| = k)}
is a finite set of possible keys. Note that it is non-empty as we can always
choose n+ 1 distinct elements of Fq since n < q and also k ≤ n.
4. Let m ∈ F, K = (x, y, I) ∈ K, c = EncK(m). First note that the condition
ei = 0 for all i ∈ I implies that DecK(c) = DecK(w + e) = DecK(w), where
w = Encode(m,x, y), as the polynomial pc only depends on the evaluations
at the good locations.
w = (w1, ..., wn) = (p(x1), ..., p(xn)) , pc(xi) = wi = p(xi), ∀i ∈ I
The polynomials p and pc evaluate equally in at least k points. They are





≤ k. Necessarily the two
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Algorithm 1 Code-based Homomorphic Encryption Scheme
Setup
Input: (n, k, q, µ), such that n, k, q, µ ∈ N, q is a prime power, k ≤ n, n < q,
2k ≥ µ
Output: K = (x, y, I), x ∈ Fn, y ∈ F, I ⊂ {1, . . . , n}, |I| = k
F := Fq
for i = 1→ n do
choose xi ← F \ {x1, . . . , xi−1}
end for
set x := (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Fn
choose y ← F \ {x1, ..., xn}
choose a random I ⊂ {1, ..., n}, such that |I| = k
return the key K = (x, y, I)
Encode
Input: m ∈ F, x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Fn, y ∈ F
Output: w ∈ Fn





set p := p− p(y) +m
for i = 1→ n do
wi := p(xi)
end for
set w := (w1, ..., wn) ∈ Fn
return w
Encrypt
Input: m ∈ F, K = (x, y, I)
Output: c ∈ Fn
for i = 1→ n do
if i ∈ I then
set ei := 0 ∈ F
else
choose ei ← F
end if
end for
set the ciphertext c = (c1, ..., cn) := Encode(m,x, y) + (e1, . . . , en) ∈ Fn
return c
Decrypt
Input: c ∈ Fn, K = (x, y, I)
Output: m ∈ F
find the polynomial pc ∈ F[x], such that deg(pc) < k and pc(xi) = ci for all
i ∈ I
set m := pc(y)
return m
polynomials are equal. In particular, pc(y) = p(y). The polynomial p has
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been chosen in such way that p(y) = m. We can recapitulate:
DecK (EncK(m)) = DecK(c) = DecK(w + e)
= DecK(w) = pc(y) = p(y) = m.
As the key K and the message m were chosen arbitrarily, the Condition 4
of Definition 1 is satisfied, which concludes the proof.
Proposition 12. The cryptosystem, described by Algorithm 1 is additively ho-
momorphic and µ-multiplicative.
Proof. Clearly, the cryptosystem is additively homomorphic. Let l ∈ N, l < µ
























= DecK(c) = pc(y) ,
where pc is such polynomial, that for all i ∈ I it holds pc(xi) = ci and deg(pc) < k.








































deg (pc(j)) ≤ l · (d− 1) < k .
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Let K = (x, y, I) ∈ K. We denote x̃ = (x̃1, ..., x̃k) := (xi1 , . . . , xik), where
{i1, . . . , ik} = I. We denote C1 ⊂ Fkq a punctured Reed-Solomon code RSq(d)∗
with the codeword support x̃ = (x̃1, ..., x̃k), i.e.
C1 = {(f(x̃1), ..., f(x̃k)) | f ∈ Fq[x], deg(f) < d}
For l ∈ N we denote Cl = RSq (d · l)∗. Again we use the same codeword support
x̃.
Lemma 13. Let EncK(F) = {c ∈ C | ∃m ∈ F : Pr[EncK(m) = c] > 0}. Then
C1 = {w̃ = (w̃1, . . . , w̃k) ∈ Fk | ∃w ∈ EncK(F) : wij = w̃j, ∀j ∈ I} .
In other words, C1 is the set of possible fresh encryptions truncated at the good
locations.
These are exactly such vectors in Fn that if we interpolate them in the good
locations of x, we get a polynomial that has a degree at most d− 1. The proof of
this lemma is analogical to the proof of Lemma 9.
Proposition 14. Let C1, ..., Cµ be defined as above. Then
C1 ( C2 ( ... ( Cµ
Proof. The fact, that C1 ⊆ C2 ⊆ ... ⊆ Cµ is trivial. Let 1 < l ≤ µ. Let p ∈ F[x],
such that deg(p) = d · l − 1. Then w = Evx̃(p) ∈ Cl. Suppose, that w ∈ Cl−1.
Then there is a polynomial q ∈ F[x], deg(q) ≤ d · (l − 1) − 1. Such q evaluates
equally as p in at least k points. As k > deg(q) + 1, we get that p = q, which is
in contradiction with deg(p) > deg(q). Therefore w /∈ Cl−1 and
C1 6= C2 6= ... 6= Cµ.
As we noted in the proof of Proposition 11, the corrupt locations of a ci-
phertext do not affect the decryption. If c = (c1, . . . , cn) and we denote c̃ =
(cj1 , . . . , cjk), {j1, . . . , jk} = I, then the function Decrypt may be expressed as
follows:
Dec(x,y,I)(c) = Dec(x̃,y,{1,...,k})(c̃) .
We see, that in the context of a fixed I we can naturally identify c with c̃, w with
w̃ and n with k. We shall do so in the following section.
The idea of corrupt positions has been used so that the cryptosystem is mo-
re difficult to break. In [AAPS11] Armknecht et. al. present a reduction of the
problem of breaking this cryptosystem to the problem of decoding in a random
code. We do not describe the reduction in the thesis.
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2.3 Overcoming µ-limitation
We would like to modify the scheme in such way that we could perform an unlimi-
ted number of multiplications on codewords of fixed length, say length(w) = n.







As we explained in Section 1.2, the composition of Lagx and Evx is an identity
on L = F[x]/(
∏n
i=1(x−xi)) and the function Evx is a ring isomorphism of L and
Fn. This seems fine, because it supports the two operations (+, ·), just like we
intended. Now we have a look at the function Ex and whether there is a way, we
could modify it to overcome the limitation of µ-multiplicativity. We need to find a
ring homomorphism φ : L −→ F, so that DecK = φ ◦Lagx is a homomorphism of
rings. We will show, that such homomorphism φ needs to maintain the equivalence
on F[x] induced by the function Evx, i.e. if
∏n
i=1(x− xi) | (f1− f2), then φ(f1) =
φ(f2). Then we shall explore other properties of the homomorphism DecK , under
the requirement of additivity and full multiplicativity. Let us assume that there
is a ring homomorphism φ. We have
DecK : Fn















































































We see that φ needs to satisfy φ(
∏n
i=1(x − xi)) = 0, i.e.
∏n
i=1(x − xi) ∈ Ker(φ).
It is a necessary condition for DecK to be a homomorphism of rings.
Let us have a look at other conditions DecK needs to satisfy. We have
DecK : Fn −→ F .
It is a linear mapping, so it may be described by its values on the basis of Fn.
Let ei ∈ Fn be a vector of zeros at all positions but the i-th position, where it is
equal to 1. Then {e1, . . . , en} is a basis of Fn and we denote a = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ Fn
the vector, such that
DecK(ei) = ai, i = 1, . . . , n
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DecK is a multiplicative homomorphism, so
DecK(ei · ej) = DecK(ei) ·DecK(ej) , ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}
when i 6= j, we get
DecK(ei · ej) = DecK(0) = 0
DecK(ei) ·DecK(ej) = ai · aj , so
ai · aj = 0 ∀i 6= j .
We see, that there is at most one aα ∈ {a1, . . . , an}, such that aα 6= 0. we have
DecK(eα · eα) = DecK(eα) = aα
DecK(eα) ·DecK(eα) = aα · aα , so
a2α = aα and aα = 1 .
We get that either DecK ≡ 0, which is not very convenient, or DecK(w) only
depends on the α-th position of w = (w − 1, . . . , wα, . . . , wn) and
DecK(w) = DecK(0, . . . , 0, wα, 0, . . . , 0) = wα ·DecK(eα) = wα .
This means that the plaintext is an open part of the ciphertext, and it is
always placed at the same position - such cryptosystem would be easily broken.
When we look back at the homomorphism φ : F[x] −→ F,
φ : F[x] −→ F
p 7−→ m ,
We see that φ = DecK ◦Evx and
φ(p) = DecK(Evx(p)) = DecK(p(x1), . . . , p(xn)) = p(xα) ,
so φ is the homomorphism that evaluates polynomials in the point xα, where
xα ∈ {x1, . . . , xn} ∈ F.
Note, that
∏n
i=1(x− xi) is indeed in Ker(φ).
We conclude, that the limitation on the number of possible multiplications
cannot be overcome by modification of the Expression function.
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2.4 Linearly algebraic perspective
In this section we take a further look at the function DecK and propose a ve-
ry simple attack on the cryptosystem. The possibility of this attack has been
identified by Armknecht et. al. in [AAPS11].
Proposition 15. For a key K ∈ K, K = (x, y, I) there exists a vector a =


















wi · ai =
∑
i∈I





















We denote w̃ = (wi)i∈I , x̃ = (xi)i∈I . Then
n∑
i=1
wi · ai = Lagx̃(w̃)(y) = DecK(w) .
The attack works as follows. Attacker collects n pairs of plaintext-ciphertext:
{(m1, c1), . . . , (mn, cn)}. It holds
∑n
i=1 cijai = mj, for j = 1, . . . , n. We have n
linear equations in n variables. If the ciphertexts are linearly independent then
the system of equations has a unique solution a. Then any ciphertext c ∈ Fn may
be decrypted as DecK(c) =
∑n
i=1 ciai.
We see that the cryptosystem only allows us to safely encrypt at most n− 1
messages with one key. This is a very strong limitation.
We note, that this type of an attack may be applied to any additively homo-
morphic encryption scheme, where C has a finite dimension. In this cryptosystem,
the attack is especially feasible as the dimension of the ciphertext space is par-
ticularly low.
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3. Gröbner bases introduction
3.1 Orderings
The following definitions appear in [Win96]. We reformulate them to meet the
notation of this thesis.
Definition 16. Let [X] be the set of terms in n variables, i.e.
[X] =
{
xi11 · · ·xinn | ij ∈ N0, j = 1, . . . , n
}
.
An ordering < on [X] is called admissible if it satisfies the following two condi-
tions:
1. 1 = x01 · · ·x0n < t, for all t ∈ [X] \ {1}
2. s < t⇒ su < tu, for all s, t, u ∈ [X].
Definition 17. Let π be a permutation on {1, . . . , n}. We define the lexicographic
ordering with xπ(1) > . . . > xπ(n) in the following way:
xi11 · · · xinn <lex,π x
j1
1 · · · xjnn , if there exists such l ∈ {1, . . . , n}, that
iπ(k) = jπ(k), for all k ∈ N, k < l and iπ(l) < jπ(l).
Definition 18. The graduated lexicographic ordering with respect to permutation
π and a weight function w : {1, . . . , n} −→ R+ is defined as follows:
xi11 · · ·xinn <glex,π,w x
j1












1 · · ·xinn <lex,π x
j1
1 · · ·xjnn .
Proposition 19. The lexicographic ordering with respect to π and the graduated
lexicographic ordering with respect to π and w are admissible orderings.
Proof. 1lex Let s ∈ [X] \ {1}. We have s = xi11 · · ·xinn and there exists some
k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, such that ik > 0. We set l ∈ {1, . . . , n} the smallest number
that satisfies iπ(l) > 0. Then l satisfies 0 = iπ(k) for all k < l and 0 < iπ(l),
i.e. 1 <lex,π s.
2lex Let s, t, u ∈ [X]. We can write these as s = xi11 · · ·xinn , t = x
j1
1 · · ·xjnn and
u = xm11 · · ·xmnn . Then su = xi1+m11 · · · xin+mnn and tu = x
j1+m1
1 · · · xjn+mnn .
Since s <lex,π t, there exists such l that iπ(k) = jπ(k), for all k ∈ N, k <
l and iπ(l) < jπ(l). This implies that l also satisfies iπ(k) + mπ(k) = jπ(k) +
mπ(k), for all k ∈ N, k < l and iπ(l) +mπ(l) < jπ(l) +mπ(l), i.e. su <lex,π tu.
We have shown that <lex,π is an admissible ordering on [X].
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1glex Let s ∈ [X] \ {1}. Then s = xi11 · · ·xinn , where ij ∈ N0 and there exists
an l ∈ {1, . . . , n}, such that il > 0. We have w(k) > 0, ik ≥ 0 for all










and 1 < s.







k=1w(k)jk and s <lex,π t.




















In the other case we have
∑n
k=1w(k)(ik + mk) =
∑n
k=1w(k)(jk + mk) and
su <lex,π tu, because <lex,π is an admissible ordering as shown earlier in the
proof. We conclude, that su <glex,π,w tu and that <glex,π,w is an admissible
ordering.
Notation 20. Let K be a field. Fix an admissible ordering < on [X]. Let f ∈
K[x1, . . . , xn]. We denote lt(f), lc(f), lm(f) the leading term, leading coefficient
and leading monomial of f respectively. The word ”leading” is used in the context
of the ordering <.
We define degxi(f) as the highest power of xi, that appears in the monomials of
f . We use deg(f) for the total degree of f , i.e. deg(f) =
∑n
i=1 degxi(lt(f)), where
the leading term is taken with respect to the graduated lexicographic ordering with
a constant weight. As an example we take f = x1x32+x
2
1. Then degx1(f) = 2 and
deg(f) = 4.
Definition 21. Let K be a field. An admissible ordering < on [X] induces a
partial ordering on K[x1, . . . , xn] as follows. Let f, g ∈ K[x1, . . . , xn].
f < g if f = 0 and g 6= 0
or if lt(f) < lt(g)
or if lt(f) = lt(g) and lc(f) < lc(g)
or if lm(f) = lm(g) and (f − lm(f)) < (g − lm(g))
We can use the third condition for f < g if there is some natural, possibly
partial ordering on F, clear from the context.
3.2 Gröbner bases
At this point we have a sufficient background on orderings, to be able to introduce
the Gröbner bases. The definitions, propositions, algorithms and some proofs in
this section are based on those from the Chapter 6 in [SBff11].
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Definition 22 (Gröbner basis). Fix an admissible ordering < on [X]. Let G =
{g1, . . . , gm} ⊂ F[x1, . . . , xn]. G is a Gröbner basis if the reduction modulo G is
unique in the following sense: Let f ∈ F[x1, . . . , xn]. We set f ′ := f . If there is
such gj ∈ G, that reduces f ′, i.e. f ′ mod gj 6= f ′, we set f ′ := f ′ mod gj and we
repeat the process. If no gj ∈ G reduces f ′, we set f mod G := f ′. The reduction
is unique if we always get the same result no matter which sequence of gj’s we
use in the process.
Note, that the reductions modulo gj depend on the ordering <, because the
lt (gj) depends on it.
Definition 23 (s-polynomial). Let f, f ′ ∈ F[x1, . . . , xn]. We define
spol (f, f ′) := lcm (lt (f) , lt (f ′)) mod f − lcm (lt (f) , lt (f ′)) mod f ′ .
Let F be a finite set of polynomials in F[x1, . . . , xn]. There are algorithms, that
compute a Gröbner basis of 〈F 〉 ⊂ F[x1, . . . , xn]. One example is the Buchberger
algorithm.
Algorithm 2 Buchberger Algorithm
Input: F ⊂ F[x1, . . . , xn]
Output: G ⊂ F[x1, . . . , xn], such that 〈F 〉 = 〈G〉 and G is a Gröbner basis
while ∃ (f, f ′) ∈ F : spol (f, f ′) mod F 6= 0 do
F := F ∪ {spol (f, f ′) mod F}
end while
set G := F
return G
Proposition 24. Buchberger algorithm works.
See [SBff11] or [Win96] for the proof.
Definition 25. A Gröbner basis G is called reduced if for all g ∈ G it holds
g mod G \ {g} = g .
A Gröbner basis G is called normed if for all g ∈ G it holds
lc (g) = 1 .
The Buchberger algorithm does not generally produce a reduced normed Gröb-
ner basis. However, once we have some Gröbner basis, it is easy to reduce it as
we can see in Algorithm 3.
A reduced Gröbner basis can be transformed into a normed one, by simply
dividing each element of the basis by its leading coefficient.
Proposition 26. Let I be an ideal in F[x1, . . . , xn]. Then there exists a unique
normed reduced Gröbner basis G, such that 〈G〉 = I.
See [Win96] for the proof of this proposition.
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Algorithm 3 Gröbner basis reduction
Input: G ⊂ F[x1, . . . , xn] a Gröbner basis
Output: G̃ ⊂ F[x1, . . . , xn] a reduced Gröbner basis
while ∃ (f, f ′) ∈ G such, that f mod f ′ = g, f 6= g do
if lt (f ′) | lt (f) then
set G := G \ {f}
else
set G := G \ {f} ∪ {g}
end if
end while
set G̃ := G
return G̃
3.3 Zero-dimensional ideals
Definition 27. Let K be a field and I ( K[x1, . . . , xn] an ideal. Then I is called
zero-dimensional if
dimK (K[x1, . . . , xn]/I) <∞ .
Proposition 28. Let I ( K[x1, . . . , xn] be an ideal. Let G ⊂ I be the Gröbner
basis of I. Then
dimK (K[x1, . . . , xn]/I) = | {t | t is a term in K[x1, . . . , xn], t mod G = t} | .
Proof. It is easy to see, that all the terms of K[x1, . . . , xn] irreducible by G
generate K[x1, . . . , xn]/I and they are K-linearly independent. It follows, that
their number is the dimension of K[x1, . . . , xn]/I over K.
Note, that if F is a finite field, F = Fq then there is a natural mapping
π : F[x1, . . . , xn] −→ F[x1, . . . , xn]/〈xq1 − x1, . . . , xqn − xn〉
f 7−→ f mod 〈xq1 − x1, . . . , xqn − xn〉
π induces an equivalence on F[x1, . . . , xn], f ∼ f ′ on F[x1, . . . , xn] if π (f) =
π (f ′). It follows that for all a ∈ Fn it holds f (a) = f ′ (a).
Instead of working with F[x1, . . . , xn] it is convenient to consider only the ring
F[x1, . . . , xn]/〈xq1−x1, . . . , xqn−xn〉. As this ring has a finite dimension over F, so
do all of its factor rings. We shall abuse the definition of a zero-dimensional ideal
here and in the case of finite fields we say, that I, an ideal of F[x1, . . . , xn]/〈xq1 −
x1, . . . , x
q
n − xn〉 is zero-dimensional if there exists ν ∈ N, ν < q − 1 such that
the degxi of the terms in F[x1, . . . , xn]/〈x
q
1 − x1, . . . , xqn − xn〉 irreducible by I is
bounded by ν for i = 1, . . . , n. The reason, why we define it this way is that, in
a general field, an ideal I is zero-dimensional if all the I-irreducible terms have a
bounded degree in each variable. Each is bounded by some f ∈ I. When we use
the expression for finite fields, we want to say, that all the degrees of terms are
bounded by I, not by 〈xq1 − x1, . . . , xqn − xn〉.
The following proposition appears in [CLO97] in a version for the polynomial
rings over complex numbers. We state the same proposition for polynomial rings
over finite fields.
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Proposition 29. Let I ⊂ F[x1, . . . , xn] be an ideal. Let V ⊂ Fn be the algebraic
set of I, i.e. V := V (I) = {r ∈ Fn | f(r) = 0, ∀f ∈ I}. Then
|V | ≤ dimF (F[x1, . . . , xn]/I) .
Proof. This proof is analogous to the proof of proposition’s variant, presented in
[CLO97]. We will show, that given a set V = {r(1), . . . , r(k)} ⊆ Fn, V = V (I), for
some I, an ideal of F[x1, . . . , xn], we can find k F-linearly independent polynomials
in F[x1, . . . , xn]/I. Then it will follow, that
|V | ≤ dimF (F[x1, . . . , xn]/I) .
First we show, that given V = {r(1), . . . , r(k)} ⊆ Fn, we can find f1 ∈
F[x1, . . . , xn] that satisfies
f1(r
(1)) = 1 ,
f1(r
(i)) = 0, i = 2 . . . , k .
For i 6= 1 it holds r(i) 6= r(1), therefore we can find an l = l(i) ∈ {1, . . . , n}, such
that r(i)l(i) 6= r
(1)
l(i). For i = 2 . . . , k we set
bi := r
(i)






We have hi(r(1)) = 1 and hi(r(i)) = 0. Now we set f̃1 :=
∏k
















(i)) = 0, i = 2 . . . , k .
Analogously, we can find polynomials f̃2, . . . , f̃k ∈ F[x1, . . . , xn], such that
f̃j(r
(j)) = 1, j = 2, . . . , k, ,
f̃j(r
(i)) = 0, j = 2, . . . , k, i = 1, . . . , j − 1, j + 1, . . . , k .
We set fj := f̃j+I ∈ F[x1, . . . , xn]/I, j = 1, . . . , k. Now we need to show, that po-
lynomials f1, . . . , fk ∈ F[x1, . . . , xn]/I are F-linearly independent. Suppose, that
for ai ∈ F, i = 1, . . . , k it holds
∑k
i=1 aifi = 0 ∈ F[x1, . . . , xn]/I. It follows, that
if we set g =
∑k
i=1 aif̃i, we get g ∈ I, hence for j = 1, . . . , k we have g(r(j)) = 0.





(j)) = 0 + aj f̃j(r
(j)) = aj .
Hence aj = 0 for j = 1, . . . , k and we conclude, that any F-linear combination




In 1994 Neal Koblitz et al. presented a general outline for a construction of a
public-key cryptosystems based on NP-hard problems in [FK94]. As an example,
they described a cryptosystem based on the ideal membership problem and named
it Polly Cracker. A whole family of cryptosystems based on this construction has
been developed over the following years. These have played a critical role in the
development of homomorphic encryption theory, mostly serving as a base stone
on which cryptographers built more sophisticated systems. For instance, Craig
Gentry’s fully homomorphic encryption system that uses lattices [Gen09] is based
on Polly Cracker.
In this chapter we denote R = F[x1, ..., xn]/〈xq1 − x1, . . . , xqn − xn〉.
Algorithm 4 describes one particular version of Polly Cracker. In this crypto-
system, the set of messages is P = F, the set of ciphertexts is C = R and the
keys K ∈ K are pairs (SK,PK), where the secret key SK = s is a vector in Fn
and the public key PK = {f1, . . . , fk} is a set of polynomials in R.
Proposition 30. Algorithm 4 describes a probabilistic cryptosystem.
Proof. Let us check the four conditions from the definition of a cryptosystem.
1. P = F is a finite set.
2. C = R is a finite set, because the degree of polynomials is bounded by q−1
in each variable, as explained in Section 3.3.
3. The key-space K = {(s, f1, ..., fk) | s ∈ Fn, fi ∈ F[x1, ..., xn], deg(fi) ≤ ν,
fj (s) = 0, j = 1, . . . , k} is a finite set of possible keys.
4. Let m ∈ F, K = (SK,PK) = (s, f1, ..., fk) ∈ K. For all the choices of I we
have










fj (s) = m.
As the key K and the message m were chosen arbitrarily, the Condition 4
of the Definition 1 is satisfied.
The choice of I in the function Encrypt is non-deterministic, i.e. there are dif-
ferent ways to encrypt one message and the cryptosystem is probabilistic, which
concludes the proof.
Proposition 31. The cryptosystem described by Algorithm 4 is additively and
multiplicatively homomorphic.
Proof. Fix (SK,PK) = (s, f1, ..., fk) ∈ K and c1, c2 ∈ F[x1, ..., xn]. We need
to show that DecSK (c1) + DecSK (c2) = DecSK (add (c1, c2)) and DecSK (c1) ·
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Algorithm 4 Polly Cracker
Setup
Input: n, k, q, ν ∈ N, q prime power, ν < q − 1
Output: (SK,PK) , SK ∈ Fn, PK ⊂ R
set F := Fq
choose s = (s1, ..., sn)← Fn
for j = 1→ k do
choose fj ← F[x1, . . . , xn] s.t. deg (f) ≤ ν, fj (s) = 0
end for
set the secret key SK := s
set the public key PK := {f1, ..., fk}
return the key (SK,PK)
Encrypt
Input: m ∈ F, PK = {f1 . . . , fk}
Output: c ∈ F[x1, . . . , xn]
select I ⊆ {1, .., k} uniformly at random
set the ciphertext c := m+
∑
j∈I fj ∈ R
return c
Decrypt
Input: c ∈ F[x1, . . . , xn], SK = s ∈ Fn
Output: m ∈ F
set m := c (s)
return m
Add
Input: c1, c2 ∈ R
Output: c ∈ R
set c := c1 + c2 ∈ R
return c
Mult
Input: c1, c2 ∈ R
Output: c ∈ R
set c := c1 · c2 ∈ R
return c
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DecSK (c2) = DecSK (mult (c1, c2)). We have
DecSK (c1) + DecSK (c2) = c1 (s) + c2 (s)
DecSK (add (c1, c2)) = DecSK (c1 + c2) = (c1 + c2) (s) = c1 (s) + c2 (s)
DecSK (c1) ·DecSK (c2) = c1 (s) · c2 (s)
DecSK (mult (c1, c2)) = DecSK (c1 · c2) = (c1 · c2) (s) = c1 (s) · c2 (s) .
The proof could also be formulated in the following way: The evaluation of poly-
nomials in a point s ∈ Fn is a ring homomorphism:
ϕs : F[x1, . . . , xn] −→ F
f 7−→ f(s) .
〈xq1 − x1, . . . , xqn − xn〉 is an ideal of F[x1, . . . , xn]. By the fundamental theorem
on homomorphisms it follows, that ϕs is a ring homomorphism of R and F.
This cryptosystem is an example the case when eK(P) ( C. None of the
ciphertexts c ∈ C, such that deg(c) > ν, belongs to EncPK , but all decrypt to
some DecSK(c) = m ∈ F.
We have a fully homomorphic cryptosystem. We can do an unlimited number
of additions and multiplications. However, the size of a ciphertext grows linearly
with the number of multiplications. This property is not practical. Fortunate-
ly, we work with the ring R, which is finite, so after about q
ν
multiplications
the ciphertexts stop growing. Note that the use of the ring F[x1, . . . , xn]/〈xq1 −
x1, . . . , x
q
n−xn〉 instead of F[x1, . . . , xn] does not affect the decryption as s
q
i = si:
DecSK (c mod 〈xq1 − x1, . . . , xqn − xn〉) = c (s)− qi (s) (x
q
i − xi) (s) = c (s) .
Nevertheless, the size of a random polynomial in R in bits is O (qn). (The size





We need to keep the number of variables very low if we want the size of ciphertexts
to stay reasonable.
Let us have a look at the security of the system. In the following we denote
V (f1, . . . , fk) ⊂ Fn the algebraic set of polynomials f1, . . . , fk ∈ R:
V (f1, . . . , fk) = {a = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ Fn | fj (a) = 0, j = 1, . . . ,m} .
Lemma 32. Let a ∈ V (f1, . . . , fk). Then Deca = DecSK.
This lemma follows straight from the definition of V (f1, . . . , fk). We see, that
if there is more than one element in V (f1, . . . , fk), the attacker does not actually
need to find s to be able to decrypt messages. That is a security flaw of the
system.
Proposition 33. Let F be the Gröbner basis of the ideal 〈f1, . . . , fk〉. Let c ∈ R be
such polynomial, that comes from a finite number of multiplications and additions
of fresh encryptions of messages in F. Then c decrypts to 0 if and only if c
mod F = 0.
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Proof. First we show the implication
c mod F = 0⇒ DecSK (c) = 0 .
Let c mod F = 0. We denote F = {f ′1, . . . , f ′k′}. Hence c =
∑k′




ql (s) · f ′l (s) = 0 .
Now we show, that if c is a fresh encryption or if c = c1 · c2 and c1, c2 are
fresh encryptions, then the proposition holds. The rest of the proof follows by
induction.





Hence c mod F = 0 if and only if DecSK (c) = m = 0. Now let I1, I2 ⊆ {1, . . . , k},
such that






















fj ·m1 +m1 ·m2 .
Hence c mod F = 0 if and only if DecSK (c) = m1 ·m2 = 0.
Note that to prove the first implication we did not need to put any restriction
on the origin of c.
Corollary 34. If an attacker knows F , the Gröbner basis of 〈f1, . . . , fk〉, then
for a ciphertext c ∈ C (not necessarily a fresh encryption), he can calculate
m = DecSK (c) = c mod F .
Proof. Let c ∈ R a ciphertext, such that DecSK (c) = m. We denote c∗ = c−m ∈
R is an encryption of 0. The decryption is linear, hence we have DecSK (c∗ +m) =
DecSK (c∗) +m. Together we get
c mod F = c∗ mod F +m mod F = DecSK (c
∗) +m
= DecSK (c
∗ +m) = DecSK (c) ,
which concludes the proof.
The attacker does need to calculate F , the Gröbner basis of 〈f1, . . . , fk〉 first.
This calculation does have up to double-exponential complexity in the number of
variables, but as we have shown earlier, the number of variables needs to be very
small if we want to have a reasonable size of ciphertexts.
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5. Symmetric Polly Cracker -
version 1
In this section we propose a new fully homomorphic symmetric encryption scheme
inspired by Polly Cracker and the scheme described by Armknecht et. al. in
Section 2.2. The scheme is called SymPC. The first general version is SymPC1.
The Chapters 6 and 7 explore some of the scheme’s weaknesses and propose
optimized parameter settings. On this knowledge we build the second version
SymPC2 in Chapter 8.
We shall use the notation
L := F[x1, . . . , xn]/〈g1, . . . , gn〉
In SymPC1,described by Algorithm 5, the set of messages is P = F, the set of
ciphertexts is C = LL ⊂ F[x1, . . . , xn] and the keys K ∈ K are pairs (SK,MK),
where the secret key SK = s is a vector in Fn and MK = {g1, . . . , gn}, the
multiplication key, is a set of polynomials in F[x1, . . . , xn]. It is a special kind of
key, that is only used in the multiplication of ciphertexts. It provides information
about the ring of ciphertexts C. It is public, but one cannot encrypt messages
with it. That is why we do not call it a public key.
Proposition 35. Algorithm 5 describes a probabilistic cryptosystem.
Proof. Let us check the four conditions from the definition of a cryptosystem.
1. P = F is a finite set.
2. C = L ⊂ F[x1, ..., xn] is a finite set because the degree of polynomials is
bounded by ν. This is further explained in Propositions 37 and 38.
3. The key-space K = {(s, g1, ..., gn) | s ∈ Fn, gi ∈ F[x1, . . . , xn], gi (s) = 0,
i = 1, . . . , n}, is a finite set of possible keys.
4. Let m ∈ F, K = (SK,MK) ∈ K. We have
DecK (EncK (m)) = (EncK (m)) (s) = (f − f (SK) +m)(SK) = m.
As the key K and the message m were chosen arbitrarily, the Condition 4
of Definition 1 is satisfied.
The random choice of f in the function Encrypt makes the encryption non-
deterministic, hence the cryptosystem is probabilistic, which concludes the pro-
of.




Input: n, ν, q ∈ N, ν < q − 1, q is a prime power
Output: SK ∈ Fn,MK ⊂ F[x1, . . . , xn]
set F := Fq
choose s = (s1, ..., sn)← Fn
for i = 1→ n do
choose g̃i ← F[x1, . . . , xn], deg(g̃i) < ν
set gi := (xi − si) · (xνi + g̃i)
end for
set the secret key SK := s
set the multiplication key MK := {g1, . . . , gn}
return (SK,MK)
Encrypt
Input: message m ∈ F, SK ∈ Fn
Output: c ∈ L
choose f ← F[x1, . . . , xn], degxi(f) ≤ ν, i = 1, . . . , n
set c := f − f (SK) +m ∈ L
return c
Decrypt
Input: c ∈ L, SK ∈ Fn
Output: m ∈ F
set m := c (SK)
return m
Add
Input: c1, c2 ∈ L
Output: c ∈ L
set c := c1 + c2 ∈ L
return c
MultMK
Input: c1, c2 ∈ L
Output: c ∈ L
set c := c1 · c2 mod 〈g1, . . . , gn〉
return c
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Proof. Fix K ∈ K and c1, c2 ∈ L. We need to show that DecK (c1) + DecK (c2) =
DecK (add (c1, c2)). We have
DecK (c1) + DecK (c2) = c1 (s) + c2 (s)
DecK (add (c1, c2)) = DecK (c1 + c2) = (c1 + c2) (s) = c1 (s) + c2 (s) .
Proposition 37. {g1, ..., gn} is a reduced Gröbner basis of 〈g1, ..., gn〉.
Proof.
gi = (xi − si) · (xνi + g̃i) , where deg (g̃i) < ν
= xν+1i − sixνi + xig̃i − sig̃i
We set F := {g1, . . . , gn} ⊂ F[x1, . . . , xn]. If we show, that for all i, j i 6= j
the s-polynomial spol (gi, gj) = 0 mod F , we get, that Buchberger Algorithm
(Algorithm 2) outputs G = F , i.e. {g1, . . . , gn} is a Gröbner basis.
We have
spol (gi, gj) = lcm (lt (gi) , lt (gj)) mod gi − lcm (lt (gi) , lt (gj)) mod gj
= xν+1i · xν+1j mod gi − xν+1i · xν+1j mod gj
= (six
ν




j − xj g̃j + sj g̃j
)
· xν+1i
spol (gi, gj) mod F = ((six
ν





j − xj g̃j + sj g̃j
)
· xν+1i ) mod F
= ((six
ν





j − xj g̃j + sj g̃j
)
· xν+1i mod gi) mod F
= (six
ν














i − xig̃i + sig̃i) mod F
= 0 mod F = 0
We see, that {g1, . . . , gn} is a Gröbner basis. For all i, j distinct, we have gi
mod gj = gi, so {g1, . . . , gn} is a reduced Gröbner basis. Finally, all gis are monic,
so {g1, . . . , gn} is a normed reduced Gröbner basis.
Proposition 38. Let {g1, . . . , gn} be defined by in Algorithm 5. Then all the
polynomials in L = F[x1, ..., xn]/〈g1, ..., gn〉 have a degree at most ν ·n. 〈g1, ..., gn〉
is a zero-dimensional ideal and
dimF (F[x1, ..., xn]/〈g1, ..., gn〉) = (ν + 1)n .
Proof. We see, that degxi (gi) = ν + 1, i = 1, . . . , n. The proposition is a direct
consequence of the Proposition 28 and its following remark.
Corollary 39. Let V (g1, . . . , gn) = {r ∈ Fn | gi(r) = 0, i = 1, . . . , n} be the
algebraic set of the zero-dimensional ideal generated by g1, ..., gn. Then
|V (g1, . . . , gn)| ≤ (ν + 1)n .
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Proof. Follows straight from Propositions 29 and 38.
Proposition 40. The cryptosystem SymPC1 is multiplicatively homomorphic.
Proof. Fix K ∈ K and c1, c2 ∈ L. We need to show that DecK (c1) · DecK (c2) =
DecK (multMK (c1, c2)). First, note that according to the Proposition 37, the de-
finition of multMK makes sense and multMK (c1, c2) is indeed in L. We have
DecK (c1) ·DecK (c2) = c1 (s) · c2 (s)
DecK (multMK (c1, c2)) = DecK (c1 · c2 mod 〈g1, ..., gn〉)
= (c1 · c2 mod 〈g1, ..., gn〉) (s) = c1 (s) · c2 (s) ,
because c1 · c2 mod 〈g1, ..., gn〉 = c1 · c2 −
∑n
i=1 qigi for some qi ∈ F[x1, ..., xn]
and (c1 · c2 mod 〈g1, ..., gn〉) (s) = (c1 · c2) (s) −
∑n
i=1 qi (s) gi (s) = (c1 · c2) (s),
as gi (s) = 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n. Therefore,
DecK (multMK (c1, c2)) = DecK (c1) ·DecK (c2) .
5.1 Complexity of SymPC1
In this section we evaluate the complexity of each function of SymPC1. We iden-
tify the most time-consuming parts and use this information to suggest a more
efficient scheme in Chapter 8.
Setup
Input: n, ν, q ∈ N, ν < q − 1, q is a prime power
Output: SK ∈ Fn,MK ⊂ F[x1, . . . , xn]
set F := Fq
choose s = (s1, ..., sn)← Fn
for i = 1→ n do
choose g̃i ← F[x1, . . . , xn], deg(g̃i) < ν
set gi := (xi − si) · (xνi + g̃i)
end for
set the secret key SK := s
set the multiplication key MK := {g1, . . . , gn}
return (SK,MK)
In the Setup phase, the most complex operation is generation of the polynomi-
als gi. The algorithm generates n random polynomials g̃i of total degree less than
ν. We denote βi the number of coefficients of g̃i. We have βi is the number of terms





for i = 1, . . . , n. For
each i = 1, . . . , n the algorithm performs log2 q · βi assignments of random bits
to coefficients of g̃i, 2 · βi multiplications and βi additions of elements in F. The








Input: message m ∈ F, SK ∈ Fn, ν ∈ N
Output: c ∈ L
choose f ← F[x1, . . . , xn], degxi(f) ≤ ν
set c = f − f (SK) +m ∈ L
return c
end
The most complex operation in Encrypt is the evaluation of f in s = SK.
We denote α the number of coefficients of f ∈ L. We have α = (ν + 1)n. The
algorithm performs log2 q · α assignments of random values to coefficients of f ,
α evaluations of monomials in L. Each of these evaluations consists of at most
deg(f) ≤ ν · n multiplications in F. Then it adds evaluations in the monomials.
The overall complexity is O (n · (ν + 1)n+1) operations in F. We calculated the
complexity of a naive evaluation algorithm. Likely, it could be optimized, but we
lower the complexity by a modification of the encryption in Chapter 8 instead.
Decrypt
Input: c ∈ L, SK ∈ Fn
Output: m ∈ F
set m := c (SK)
return m
The complexity of this function is the same as the complexity of Encrypt,
that is O (n · (ν + 1)n+1) operations in F.
Add
Input: c1, c2 ∈ L
Output: c ∈ L
set c := c1 + c2 ∈ L
return c
end
The function performs α additions in F, so the complexity is O ((ν + 1)n)
operations in F.
MultMK
Input: c1, c2 ∈ L
Output: c ∈ L
set c := c1 · c2 mod 〈g1, . . . , gn〉
return c
The function consists of two parts, multiplication and reduction. The first
part is more complex, it involves α2 multiplications in F. The overall complexity
is O ((ν + 1)2n) operations in F.
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6. Attacks on SymPC1
In this chapter we evaluate security against chosen-ciphertext (CCA), chosen-
plaintext (CPA) and known-plaintext (KPA) attacks. Formal definitions of these
may be found in [Sti95].
Proposition 41. SymPC1 cryptosystem is not CCA secure.
Proof. If an attacker can use an oracle, that decrypts ciphertexts, i.e.
c
oracle7−−−→ DecSK(c) = c(s)
then he can just ask for the decryption of (c1, . . . , cn) = (x1, . . . xn). As an answer
he will receive (s1, . . . , sn), the points of secret key. Apparently, the system is not
CCA-secure.
Lemma 42. For SymPC1 cryptosystem, the CPA-security is equivalent to KPA-
security.
Proof. CPA-security implies KPA-security in general. To proof the other impli-
cation we need to realize, that if an attacker has a known plaintext-ciphertext pair
(m, c), where DecSK(c) = m, he can obtain a pair (m′, c′) where m′ is chosen arbit-
rarily and c′ = c−m+m′. Then DecSK(c′) = (m′). From any plaintext-ciphertext
pair, he can devise a chosen plaintext-ciphertext pair, so the cryptosystem needs
to be CPA-secure to achieve the KPA-security.
In the rest of the chapter we shall not differentiate between KPA and CPA
attacks.
We say, that a cryptosystem is bounded CPA-secure if there exists an m ∈ N,
such that the cryptosystem is CPA-secure as long as no more than m plaintexts
can be encrypted with the same key, i.e. the attacker cannot obtain more than
m plaintext-ciphertext pairs.
Conjecture 43. SymPC1 cryptosystem achieves a bounded CPA-security.
There are two obvious approaches to breaking SymPC1 by a CPA attack. One
is to try to calculate the Gröbner basis of the ideal
S = {f ∈ F[x1, . . . , xn] | f(s) = 0}
using G = {g1, . . . , gn} and {f1, . . . , fm}, a set of encryptions of 0 ∈ F. The other
approach consists of eliminating the algebraic set of G, hoping to end up only
with the secret s.
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Algorithm 6 Attack by computing the Gröbner basis
Input: G ⊆ S ⊂ F[x1, . . . , xn], {f1, . . . , fm} ∈ S
Output: F ⊆ F[x1, . . . , xn], such that 〈F 〉 = 〈G, f1, . . . , fm〉 ⊂ S and F is a
normed reduced Gröbner basis
set F := G
for l = 1→ m do
set F the normed reduced Gröbner basis of {F, fl}





6.1 Gröbner Basis approach
Here is an outline of an algorithm, that tries to calculate the Gröbner basis
of S. Assume that an attacker obtains {f1, . . . , fm}, encryptions of 0 and he
knows the public multiplicative key MK = G. Algorithm 6 calculates the normed
reduced Gröbner basis of the ideal generated by {g1, . . . , gn, f1, . . . , fm} ⊂ S. If
S = 〈g1, . . . , gn, f1, . . . , fm〉 it has to output {x1 − s1, . . . , xn − sn}, because the
normed reduced Gröbner basis of an ideal is unique, as we stated in Proposition
26.
We see that if Algorithm 6 calculated the basis of S, we can easily read the
secret key s = (s1, . . . , sn) from the output. The two important questions are:
What is the complexity of the algorithm?
What is the chance, that the algorithm actually calculated the basis of S?
The first question is difficult to answer, because it is even hard to tell, how
long a calculation of a Gröbner basis takes in general. This is calculation of a
Gröbner basis, given a ”partial” Gröbner basis and further generators of an ideal.
Intuitively, this may have a lower time-complexity than the general case.
The second question asks, what is the chance, that the ideal generated by G
and {f1, . . . , fm} is equal to S. Here we have a more satisfying answer than the
first question. We look at the ideals
〈G〉 = 〈F0〉 ⊆ 〈F1〉 ⊆ · · · ⊆ 〈Fm〉 ⊆ · · · = S ,
where F0 = G = {g1, . . . , gn} and for j = 1, . . . ,m, Fj = {g1, . . . , gn, f1, . . . , fj}.
In the Chapter 7 we show, that if the polynomials fj from S are chosen
uniformly at random and if we keep increasing m, the mean value of m at the
point when we reach 〈Fm〉 = S is about m = n. This estimate is only valid for
|F| = q large enough and under certain other conditions. Once we have proven
this, we can just prevent the attacker from seeing more than the critical number
of plaintext-ciphertext pairs. No matter what the complexity of the attack is, it
will never work as the reduction of a ciphertext modulo 〈Fm−1〉 does not give us
any information about the plaintext. For more details refer to Section 7.3.
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6.2 Algebraic sets approach
The attack by Algorithm 7 finds the algebraic set of the ideal generated by G
which is
V (G) = {r ∈ Fn | g(r) = 0, ∀g ∈ G} .
Then it takes fj’s one by one and computes the intersection of the algebraic sets
V (G) ∩ V (f1) ∩ . . . ∩ V (fj).
Algorithm 7 Attack by computing the algebraic sets
Input: G, G ⊆ S ⊂ F[x1, . . . , xn], {f1, . . . , fm} ∈ S
Output: V, V ⊂ Fn, such that V = V (G, f1, . . . , fm)
set V := ∅
for all r ∈ Fn do
if gi(r) = 0, i = 1, . . . , n then
set V := V ∪ {r}
end if
end for
for l = 1→ m do
set Ṽ := ∅
for all r ∈ V do
if fl(r) = 0 then
set Ṽ := Ṽ ∪ {r}
end if
end for
set V := Ṽ
end for
return V
Since G ⊆ S and {f1, . . . , fm} ⊂ S, we see that V (S) ⊆ V (G) and V (S) ⊆
V (fj), for j = 1, . . . ,m. It is obvious, that V (S) = {s}, hence
s ∈ V (G) ∩
m⋂
j=1
V (fj) = V (G, f1, . . . , fm) .
We know, that Algorithm 7 outputs a non-empty set of candidates for the secret
key s. Let V be the output of Algorithm 7. If V has only one element, we know,
that it is the secret key s and the attack is successful. On the other hand, if the
output set V contains a lot of elements, say |V |  q, then every ciphertext c
may be decrypted in many ways. In particular, we know that DecSK(c) = c(s) ∈
c(V ) = {c(r) | r ∈ V }. c(V ) ⊆ F, its size grows with |V | and we approach to the
point when c(V ) = F. We see, that if c(V ) is large enough, we gain very little or
no information about DecSK(c). This is further explained in Section 7.3.
The complexity of Algorithm 7 is O(qn) evaluations in F[x1, . . . , xn] and does
not actually depend on m. It seems that, like it may be faster than Algorithm 6.
Note, that the two attacks are equivalent in certain way. The first one calcula-
tes Gröbner bases of ideals F0, . . . , Fm and the other one calculates the algebraic
sets of the very same ideals.
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In particular, Algorithm 7 computes the secret key s if and only if V (S) = {s}
= V (G, f1, . . . , fm) , i.e. it succeeds if and only if 〈G, f1, . . . , fm〉 = Fm = S. This
is exactly the case when Algorithm 6 succeeds.
The success of both attacks may be avoided by bounding the maximum num-
ber of messages, that are allowed to be encrypted with one key. The adequate
bound m ∈ N depends on the size of F and the number of variables. Suggestions
on the parameter setting are given in Section 7.3.
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7. Security of SymPC1
In the previous chapter we identified a threat imposed by two attacks. We also
stated that these two attacks may or may not be successful depending on the
circumstances. In this chapter we describe the circumstances under which the
attacks succeed. Recall that the two attacks are equivalent on the matter of
succeeding. Either both attacks succeed of both fail. We find it more transparent
to deal with the algebraic set attack.
After description of the circumstances, we evaluate the likelihood of these
occurring. This likelihood depends on the Setup parameters n, q, ν, the bound
on the number of plaintexts allowed to be encrypted with the same key and the
particular choice of the multiplication key MK = {g1, . . . , gn} in the Setup.
Let us recall and define notation used in this chapter:
The secret key SK = s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ Fn.
In this chapter only, we denote R = F[x1, . . . , xn].
For i = 1, . . . , n gi ∈ R are chosen by Setup of SymPC1 as follows:
gi := (xi − si) · (xνi + g̃i) ,
where g̃i is such that g̃i ∈ F[x1, . . . , xn], deg(g̃i) < ν. For i = 1, . . . , n, the poly-
nomials deg (gi) = ν + 1 and gi(s) = 0.
S and G are ideals in R defined as follows:
S = 〈x1 − s1, . . . , xn − sn〉
G = 〈g1, . . . , gn〉
We can see that G ⊂ S. In Chapter 5 we showed that {g1, . . . , gn} is a Gröbner
basis of G and G is a zero-dimensional ideal in F[x1, . . . , xn]. We have the algebraic
set V (S) = {s},
V (G) = {r ∈ Fn | gi(r) = 0, i = 1, . . . , n}
and s ∈ V (G). We set t := |V (G) |. According to Proposition 29, t ≤ (ν + 1)n.
We number the elements of V (G):
V (G) =
{
r(1), . . . , r(t)
}
, r(t) = s








, j = 1 . . . , t.
We would like to show that the mapping
ϕ : S/G −→ Ft−1 × {0}
f 7−→ (f(r(1)), . . . , f(r(t)))
is a surjective homomorphism of vector spaces over F. From this result we shall
devise information on the distribution of zeros of polynomials in S/G.
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7.1 Preliminary lemmas
Lemma 44. The mapping
ϕ : R/G −→ Ft
f 7−→ (f(r(1)), . . . , f(r(t))) ,
where r(1), . . . , r(t) are elements of V (G), is a homomorphism of vector spaces
over F.
Proof. We have ϕ(0) = (0, . . . , 0) ∈ Ft. Let f, g ∈ R/G, a ∈ F. We have f + g, a ·
f ∈ R/G,
ϕ(f + g) = ((f + g)(r(1)), . . . , (f + g)(r(t)))
= (f(r(1)), . . . , f(r(t))) + (g(r(1)), . . . , g(r(t)))
= ϕ(f) + ϕ(g)
ϕ(af) = (af(r(1)), . . . , af(r(t)))
= a · (f(r(1)), . . . , f(r(t))) = a · ϕ(f) .
We have shown, that ϕ is a homomorphism of vector spaces over F.
The mapping ϕ is actually a ring homomorphism and the lemma could be
proved by the fundamental theorem on homomorphism, but we decided to present
only a weaker version of the lemma and a transparent proof for better clarity of
the following propositions.
Corollary 45. The mapping
ϕ : S/G −→ Ft−1 × {0}
f 7−→ (f(r(1)), . . . , f(r(t)))
is a homomorphism of vector spaces over F.
Proof. This corollary is a direct consequence of the previous lemma and the fact,
that for f ∈ S it holds f(r(t)) = f(s) = 0.
Proposition 46. The homomorphism ϕ : S/G −→ Ft−1 × {0} is surjective.
Proof. Proof of this proposition is very similar to the proof of Proposition 29.
However, we need to pay a special attention to the fact, that we work with the
ideal S. To avoid any confusion we present the full proof.
Let ui = (0, . . . , 1, . . . , 0) ∈ Ft be a vector with a 1 at the i-th position,
i = 1, . . . , t − 1. We show that we can find f ∈ S/G, such that ϕ(f) = ui. As i
has been chosen arbitrarily and ϕ is a linear mapping, this will show, that ϕ is
surjective.
The desired f needs to satisfy
f(r(i)) = 1 ,
f(r(j)) = 0, j = 1 . . . , i− 1, i+ 1, . . . , t .
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For j 6= i it holds r(j) 6= r(i), therefore we can find an l = l(j) ∈ {1, . . . , n}, such
that r(j)l(j) 6= r
(i)
l(j). For j = 1 . . . , i− 1, i+ 1, . . . , t we set
bj := r
(j)






We have hj(r(i)) = 1 and hj(r(j)) = 0. Now we set f̃ :=
∏t















(j)) = 0, j = 1 . . . , i− 1, i+ 1, . . . , t .
We want to show that f̃ ∈ S. We have f̃(s) = f̃(r(t)) = 0, therefore f̃ ∈ S.
Now we set f := f̃ +G ∈ S/G. As r(j) ∈ V (G) for j = 1, . . . , t, we get
f(r(i)) = f̃(r(i)) = 1 ,
f(r(j)) = f̃(r(j)) = 0, j = 1 . . . , i− 1, i+ 1, . . . , t .




Ker(ϕ) ' Ft−1 ,
hence for every u ∈ Ft−1 there exist |Ker(ϕ)| polynomials f in S/G, such that
ϕ(f) = u||0.
Proof. This is a direct consequence of Proposition 46 and the First Isomorphism
Theorem.
Corollary 48. Choose f ∈ S/G uniformly at random. Then for all u ∈ Ft−1×{0}
it holds




i.e. ϕ(f) is distributed uniformly over Ft−1 × {0}. In particular, for r ∈ V (G),
r 6= s it holds




Furthermore, the values f(r(1)), . . . , f(r(t−1)) are independent.
Proof. Follows straight from the previous corollary.
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7.2 Security evaluation
Let f1, . . . , fm be encryptions of 0, i.e. f1, . . . , fm are chosen from S/G uniformly
at random. As we suggested in Chapter 6, we want to calculate the expected
size of V (G, f1, . . . , fm). This will be the expected number of candidates for the
secret key s. From the Corollary 48 we get, that ϕ(f1), . . . , ϕ(fm) are independent
vectors, uniformly distributed over Ft−1×{0}. In particular, for i = 1, . . . , t−1, the
i-th coordinates of vectors ϕ(fl), these are f1(r(i)), . . . , fm(r(i)), are independent,
uniformly distributed elements of F.
Let r ∈ V (G) \ {s}. Then
Pr[r ∈ V (f1, . . . , fm)] = Pr[fl(r) = 0, l = 1, . . . ,m] =
m∏
l=1
Pr[fl(r) = 0] = q
−m .
Now we can calculate the expected value of |V (G, f1, . . . , fm) | as follows.
E[|V (G, f1, . . . , fm) |] =
∑
r∈V (G)








q−m + 1 =
|V (G) | − 1
qm
+ 1
We calculated, that the expected number of candidates for the secret key
s is |V (G)|−1
qm
+ 1. This number depends on |V (G) | and m. As we have seen in
Corollary 39, the size of V (G) is at most (ν + 1)n. We will try to optimize the
actual value to reach this bound. m, the maximum number of messages, allowed
to be encrypted with the same key, is a parameter, we can set according to the
desired security level.
7.3 Parameter settings
Let c ∈ F[x1, . . . , xn] be a ciphertext, DecSK(c) = c(s) = m. Suppose there is an
attacker, who has the public multiplicative key MK = G and a set {f1, . . . , fm} ⊂
S, i.e. fl(s) = 0, l = 1, . . . ,m. Let him perform a KPA/CPA attack using the
Algorithm 7 and let V be the output of Algorithm 7, V = {r(1), . . . , r(|V |)}, s ∈ V .
The attacker has gained the following information about DecSK(c) = m:
m ∈ c (V ) = {c (r) | r ∈ V } .
We would like to calculate the probability, that an attacker has gained no
information about the plaintext m, by computing V . He knows, that a plaintext
m is in c (V ) = {c (r) | r ∈ V }. If c (V ) = F, then he has no information. Here
we need to point out, that in fact, it might happen, that even though c(V ) = F,
there would exist such a, b ∈ F, that
|{r ∈ V | c(r) = a}|  |{r ∈ V | c(r) = b}|
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Then m = a would be likelier than m = b and the attacker would have gained
some information. However, the values of c(r) are distributed uniformly over F,
because we have c = f+m, for some random f ∈ S, r ∈ V (G), hence by Corollary
48, the values of f(r) are distributed uniformly over F. The addition of m only
shifts all the values by a constant. This does not affect the uniform distribution,
hence c(r) are distributed uniformly over F. We conclude that the scenario, where
many values of c(r) accumulate in one point, is unlikely and we further suppose,
that if c(V ) = F, then the attacker has gained no information.
What is Pr[c (V ) = F]? We have shown, that c(r(1)), . . . , c(r(|V |)) are indepen-
dent values, distributed uniformly over F, i.e. for a fixed a ∈ F and r ∈ V , we




Pr[a /∈ c (V )] = Pr[c (r) 6= a,∀r ∈ V ] =
|V |∏
i=1






We denote {a1, . . . , aq} = F. Then, by inductive application of the Law of total
probability, we get
Pr[c (V ) = F] = 1− Pr[a1 /∈ c (V )]− Pr[a2 /∈ c (V ) , a1 ∈ c (V )]− . . .−
− Pr[aq /∈ c (V ) , a1, . . . , aq−1 ∈ c (V )]

























If we further assume, that the size of the output V is its expected value,
calculated in the previous section,
|V | = E[|V |] = E[|V (G, f1, . . . , fm) |]
=
|V (G) | − 1
qm
+ 1
then we get, that the chance, the attacker has gained no information about the
plaintext is
Pr[c (V ) = F] > 1− q
eb
, b =






Table 7.1 illustrates approximate values of 1− q
eb
for different choices of parameters
q, n, ν,m, when we set |V (G)| := (ν + 1)n, the optimistic value. Notice, that the
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Table 7.1: Lower bounds on Pr[c (V ) = F]
m = 6 m = 7 m = 8 m = 9, . . . , 15 m = 16 m = 17
q = 9 n = 10 1 0,99997 < 0 < 0 < 0 < 0
ν = 5 n = 20 1 1 1 1 < 0 < 0
q = 81 n = 10 1 1 0,94282 < 0 < 0 < 0
ν = 40 n = 20 1 1 1 1 1 < 0
q = 210 n = 10 1 1 1 < 0 < 0 < 0
ν = 29 n = 20 1 1 1 1 1 1
table does not give the values of Pr[c (V ) = F]. It only shows its approximate
lower bounds.
We notice, that for a large m, the value of 1− q
eb
is less than 0. This happens
when |V (G)| − 1 < qm+1 and the presumed |V |  q does not hold. In such
cases, the bound is not very accurate. We interpret is as it does not give us any
information on Pr[c (V ) = F]. However, we can guess, that the probability is very
low. In fact it reaches zero once we get to |V | < q.
For small m, the table says, that the value of 1 − q
eb
is 1. Apparently, the
actual value of 1− q
eb
must be less than 1, as q
eb
is a positive number. The value
given by the table is only approximate and we interpret it as Pr[c (V ) = F] is
very high.
Notice, that for fixed q, ν, n there is such m̃ ∈ N, that for m = 1, . . . , m̃, the
Pr[c (V ) = F] is close to 1, i.e. the cryptosystem is secure against the attack by
Algorithm 7 and for m > m̃, the Pr[c (V ) = F] may be very low and the attack
might have a high chance of a success. In the table we can also see, that the rate
of m̃
n
ranges between 0,70 and 0,85 and it grows with q and n. The table does not
show this information, but we can calculate, that for q = 232, ν = 231, n = 20 the
rate is 0,95 and m̃ = 19 = n− 1.
We conclude, that for q = 232, ν = 231 and higher, the setting of the parameter
m = n − 1 is secure against the attacks described in Chapter 6. We need to
emphasize here, that this security is only achieved, if the optimistic condition
|V (G)| = (ν + 1)n holds. In the following chapter we show, how we can ensure
that this condition holds.
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8. Symmetric Polly Cracker -
version 2
In Chapters 6 and 7 we have seen, that the security of SymPC1 increases with
the size of the algebraic set V (G). In this chapter we present a second version of
SymPC, called SymPC2, where we intend to maximize V (G). As a co-product of
this adjustment we get a lower complexity of the Setup phase of the algorithm.
The new version SymPC2 is described by Algorithm 8. It uses the same set
of messages P = F, the set of ciphertexts is C ⊂ F[x1, . . . , xn] and again the
keys K ∈ K are pairs (SK,MK), where the secret key SK = s is a vector
in Fn and MK = {g1, . . . , gn}, the multiplication key, is a set of polynomials
in F[x1, . . . , xn]. In addition, there is a new parameter ξ ∈ N, which says ”how
sparse” are the polynomials on the output of the function Encrypt.
The Algorithm 8 differs from Algorithm 5 in the phases Setup and Encrypt.
In Setup, the polynomials gi in the multiplicative key are in F[xi] and they de-
compose to linear factors over F. Furthermore, they are square-free. As we will
show in Propositions 51 and 52, such choice maximizes the size of V (G).
In function Encrypt, the polynomials f are chosen in such way, that the num-
ber of non-zero coefficients of f ∈ L = F[x1, . . . , xn]/〈g1, . . . , gn〉 is at most ξ − 1
and therefore the number of non-zero coefficients of the ciphertext is at most ξ. If
ξ  (ν+ 1)n, we get that the fresh encryptions are sparse polynomials in L. This
should speed up the evaluation performed in functions Encrypt and Decrypt and
also multiplication and addition of fresh ciphertexts. Note, that if a ciphertext
c ∈ L has been obtained by multiplying a large number of fresh encryptions, it
no longer needs to be sparse, therefore the complexity of Decrypt does not get
improved in general, only in the case of decrypting fresh encryptions.
Further in this chapter we conjecture, that these modifications do not af-
fect the security in any way, other than the mentioned improvement, caused by
optimizing the size of V (G).
Proposition 49. Algorithm 8 describes a cryptosystem, that is additively and
multiplicatively homomorphic.
Proof. Algorithm 8 describes a cryptosystem, that is a variant of cryptosystem
SymPC1.
Proposition 50. {g1, ..., gn} is a reduced Gröbner basis of 〈g1, ..., gn〉, the po-
lynomials in F[x1, ..., xn]/〈g1, ..., gn〉 have a degree at most ν · n, 〈g1, ..., gn〉 is a
zero-dimensional ideal and
dimF (F[x1, ..., xn]/〈g1, ..., gn〉) = (ν + 1)n .
Proof. The polynomials {g1, ..., gn}, chosen in the Setup of Algorithm 8 are of
the form of polynomials chosen in the Setup of the Algorithm 5, hence the proof
is a consequence of Propositions 37 and 38.




Input: n, ν, q ∈ N, ν < q − 1, q is a prime power
Output: SK ∈ Fn,MK ⊂ F[x1, . . . , xn]
set F := Fq
choose s = (s1, ..., sn)← Fn
for i = 1→ n do
for l = 1→ ν do










for i = 1→ n do







set the secret key SK := s
set the multiplication key MK := {g1, . . . , gn}
return (SK,MK)
Encryptξ
Input: message m ∈ F, SK ∈ Fn, ν ∈ N
Output: c ∈ L
set f := 0 ∈ F[x1, . . . , xn]
for l = 1→ ξ − 1 do
choose a← F
choose (i1, . . . , in)← {0, . . . , ν}n
set f := f + a · xi11 · · ·xinn
end for
set c = f − f (SK) +m ∈ F[x1, . . . , xn]/〈g1, . . . , gn〉
return c
Decrypt
Input: c ∈ L, SK ∈ Fn
Output: m ∈ F
set m := c (SK)
return m
Add
Input: c1, c2 ∈ L
Output: c ∈ L
set c := c1 + c2 ∈ L
return c
MultMK
Input: c1, c2 ∈ L
Output: c ∈ L
set c := c1 · c2
for i = 1→ n do





V (g1, ..., gn) =
{








, i = 1, . . . , n
}
.
Apparently, there are (ν + 1)n different choices of r ∈ V (g1, ..., gn).
Proposition 52. For given parameters ν and n, the choice of the set G =
{g1, ..., gn} in the Setup phase of SymPC2 maximizes the size of V (G).
Proof. As we have seen in Proposition 29, the size of an algebraic set of a zero-
dimensional ideal I in F[x1, . . . , xn] is at most dimF (F[x1, . . . , xn]/I). We have
dimF (F[x1, . . . , xn]/G) = (ν + 1)n = V (G) .
8.1 Complexity of SymPC2
In this section we investigate the impact of the modification of functions Setup
and Encrypt on the complexity of each function of the algorithm SymPC2.
Setup The generation of polynomials {g1, . . . , gn} has become a lot simpler. For
each gi we need to perform ν multiplications of polynomials of degrees at
most ν and one in F[xi]. The complexity is O(n · ν2) operations in F.
Encrypt Again, the most time-consuming operation is the evaluation of the
polynomial f in the point s ∈ Fn. This can be divided into evaluation of
monomials of f and later addition of these. We have ξ monomials, each
evaluation consists of at most ν · n multiplications in F. Overall we get the
complexity of O(ξ · ν · n) operations in F.
Decrypt The complexity of this function strongly depends on the nature of
the ciphertext on the input. If it is a fresh encryption, i.e. it is a sparse
polynomial, then the complexity is the same as the complexity of Encrypt
in SymPC2, that is O(ξ ·ν ·n) operations in F. If it is a ciphertext, that has
been created by evaluation of ciphertext polynomial of a high degree or of
a ciphertext polynomial, that has many monomials, i.e. the ciphertext is no
longer sparse, then the complexity of Decrypt is the same as in SymPC1,
that is O(n · (ν + 1)n).
Add Similarly, the complexity of the function Add ranges from O(ξ) operations
in F for a fresh sparse ciphertext to O((ν + 1)n) operations in F for a dense
composite ciphertext.
Mult The complexity of the first part of the function - multiplication ranges
from O(ξ2) to O((ν + 1)2n) operations in F, analogically to the function
Add. The later part - reduction performs at most n reductions modulo a
polynomial in F[xi]. For a dense ciphertext, each reduction by gi of degree
ν + 1 takes O((ν + 1)((ν + 1)n − (ν + 1))) operations in F, overall that is
O(n · (ν+ 1)n+1) operations. When we have a sparse polynomial and reduce
it, it becomes dense quite fast. We see, that for sparse ciphertexts we get
complexity O(n · (ν + 1)n+1) and for dense ciphertexts we get O((ν + 1)2n)
operations in F.
46





n! n · ν
2 n · ν2
Encrypt n · (ν + 1)n ξ · ν · n ξ · ν · n
Decrypt n · (ν + 1)n ξ · ν · n n · (ν + 1)n
Add (ν + 1)n ξ (ν + 1)n
Mult (ν + 1)2n n · (ν + 1)n (ν + 1)2n
The Table 8.1 shows the comparison of the complexity of algorithms SymPC1
and SymPC2. We omit the O-notation.
8.2 Security of SymPC2
What are the security implications of the changes, we made? We have maximized
the size of V (G), which made it possible to count on the lower bounds from Table
7.1. In other words, if we encrypt no more than about n − 1 messages with one
key, the cryptosystem is secure against the two attacks from Chapter 6.
Let us have a look at the complexity implications on the attack by compu-
ting algebraic sets (described by Algorithm 7). The phase where the algorithm
calculates the algebraic set V (G) has become simpler as the attacker only checks
evaluations in n · ν points. On the other hand, the initial size of V (G) is larger,
so it takes more calculations to find V (G, f1), V (G, f1, f2), etc.
Again, no matter what the complexity of the attack is, we can prevent the
attack from succeeding the same way as before.
In Section 7.1 we showed, that the distribution of zeros of polynomials from
S/G is uniformly random. We would like to be able to prove, that the same holds
in the case of sparse polynomials. We do not see a reason, why a polynomial should
have more zeros or less zeros or why the zeros should accumulate somewhere just
because we work with a sparse polynomial, but we were unable to find a formal
proof.
Conjecture 53. Choose f ∈ S/G sparse as in the function Encrypt of SymPC2.
Then ϕ(f) is distributed uniformly over Ft−1 × {0}. In particular, for r ∈ V (G),
r 6= s it holds






In this thesis we studied the alternative approaches to fully homomorphic encryp-
tion, i.e. approaches, that are not lattice-based. First we described the scheme
by Arkmecht et al., whose security is based on the hardness of decoding in a
random linear code. Then we have looked at the family of cryptosystems called
Polly Cracker and studied its limitations. The main contribution of this thesis is
a design of a new symmetric fully homomorphic encryption scheme in which we
applied the new idea of using Gröbner bases as a tool for decreasing the size of
ciphertexts, therefore decreasing the complexity of all the operations on the set
of ciphertexts.
At the very end, let us make a rough comparison of the mentioned homo-
morphic encryption schemes. As we suggested, all the homomorphic encryption
schemes, that have been developed so far, have some issues, that make them
impractical. The Table 8.2 shows the schemes mentioned in the thesis (and one
other scheme) and their particular limitations and disadvantages. First, let us
make a short informal description of the studied limitations.
µ-bound: There is a bound on the number of multiplications performed on ci-
phertexts. In other words, if we have fresh encryptions c1, . . . , ck ∈ C, we
are only allowed to evaluate polynomials h ∈ C[y1, . . . , yk] of degree at most
µ. Evaluations of polynomials of greater degree do not necessarily decrypt
correctly.
m-bound: There is a bound on the number of messages allowed to be encrypted
with the same key. This bound is imposed, because there exists a KPA or
CPA attack, where the attacker collectsm+1 independent pairs of plaintext-
ciphertext and breaks the cryptosystem. By independent, we mean that the-
re exists no relation h, such that cm+1 = h(c1, . . . , cm), h ∈ C[y1, . . . , ym].
The non-existence of as many pairs obviously prevents the attacker from ga-
ining them. This limitation is only relevant to symmetric cryptosystems. In
public-key cryptosystems, the attacker can create himself as many plaintext-
ciphertext pairs as he likes, as the encryption key is public.
divergence: When we multiply two ciphertexts, the size of the resulting cipher-
text is greater than the two previous, i.e. if c1, . . . , ck ∈ C, then the length
of c = h(c1, . . . , ck), h ∈ C[y1, . . . , yk] grows with the degree of h. There is
either no bound on the size of a c ∈ C or there is one, which is so high,
that the implications on the complexity of decryption and other operations
make the scheme impractical.
complexity: Informally, if all the parameters of the scheme are set up in such
way, that the cryptosystem is secure against the identified threats, the com-
plexity of either key generation, encryption, decryption or operations with
ciphertexts make the scheme impractical. Description of this limitation is
very informal. We advise the reader to take it into account.
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Table 8.2: Comparison of homomorphic encryption schemes
type µ-bound m-bound divergence complexity
Polly Cracker public-key • •
Gentry public-key •
Armknecht symmetric • •
SymPC1 symmetric • •
SymPC2 symmetric •
The schemes we compare are the public-key Polly Cracker, where we consider
the variant described in Chapter 4, Craig Gentry’s Fully Homomorphic Encryp-
tion Scheme [Gen09] mentioned in the Introduction, which is also public-key,
the symmetric Code-based Encryption Scheme proposed by Armknecht et. al.
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